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Abstract	  
Despite the stance of the WTO and various RTAs, elements of trade protectionism 
remain prevalent. This could be understood by the divergence between countries’ 
national interests and international trade protocols, which was reverberated during the 
recent global financial crises. However, the contradiction has taken new turn following 
new protectionist instruments. Furthermore, the implication of these instruments on 
developing countries economy is prevalent.    Thus, this study explores the likelihood to 
engage in trade protection and the implication on developing country, focussing on 
Africa. The study observes that in the first quarter of 2012 alone, the number of 
protective measures amounts to 67, with bail out and trade defence accounting for as 
much as 74%. Similarly, from 2009 to 2011, trade defence mechanisms and bailout 
accounted for 25% of the protective measures; while tariff and non-tariff are also 
frequently used, jointly constituting about 28.11%. The study reveals that a country’s 
level of economic development is not a fundamental determining factor with regards to 
its tendency to engage in trade protectionism. However, the study establishes among 
others that as a country’s institutional quality improves, the less the tendency of being 
involved in protectionism. Paradoxically, the more a country’s trade integration, the 
higher its tendency towards protectionism, which might be alluded to the fact that when a 
country trades more, it has more interest to protect as major complainants of trade cases 
are also major traders. The study reveals that a country’s per capita income growth was 
significantly and adversely affected by the contemporary protectionism. It impacts 
negatively on trade balance; however, such impact was essentially significant for African 
countries. 	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1. Introduction	  
The drive towards cooperation by countries to enhance mutual benefit and support for 
growth and development in the form of trade, among others, has been one of the major 
preoccupations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The growth in the world trading 
system (WTS), which was indoctrinated by the consensus towards free trade of goods 
and services and mutual cooperation to enhance countries’ trading capacity, can also be 
attributed to the core reason for the drive towards regional economic cooperation by 
countries (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa-UNECA, 2006). However, for 
several decades, the debate over free trade and protectionism has continued to be a 
discursive phenomenon. The proponents of free trade advocate a minimization of the 
restrictions to international trade in favour of openness and ‘seamless’ access to the 
global market. For instance, the number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) across 
the world has more than tripled between 1990 and 2011, which can be attributable to the 
establishment of WTO (WTO, 2011a). These agreements were expected to enhance 
trade by developing the capacities of member countries to engage in trade. 	  
	  
Protectionists, on the other hand, advocate national interest and economic welfare 
through regulating imports and market entry of other countries, especially when there is 
the need to protect a given national issue such as unemployment and poverty that has 
been witnessed with the recent global financial crises. Such agreements include issues 
relating to trade policies (e.g. tariff bounds, rules of origin in some cases, regional 
infrastructural development such as regional roads, and rails amongst others 
(Osabuohien and Efobi, 2011). For example, the number of protective actions 
implemented by countries within a period of three years from November 2008 to 
November 2011 was as much as 1,593 (Global Trade Alert-GTA, 2011). The recent 
case where the the EU complained about Argentina’s import policies with respect to 
import restrictions and ‘controversial expropriation of Spanish-owned oil company’ is a 
ready example. A similar one is the China-USA dispute regarding 22 countervailing 
measures that are applied to Chinese imports, which is purportedly argued to affect 
about USD 7.3 billion of Chinese exports to USA, are ready examples (ICTSD, 2012a,b). 	  
	  
Stances towards free trade or protectionism have their pros and cons, but the choice 
and relativity to glide towards more of one and less of the other lies with the countries 
involved.  The argument for or against free trade and protection is not really new as 
similar issues emerged after the economic depression of 1930s (Eichengreen and Irwin, 
2009). However, the 2008 global economic crises has brought a new dimension to the 
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issue, as the global economic drivers before the crises have always advocated for 
nations to remove impediments to trade as could be witnessed with the formation of 
numerous Regional Economic Communities-RECs (Osabuohien and Efobi, 2011). 	  
	  
This study engages data from the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database on protectionism 
(which provides different approaches of protectionism), World Development Indicators-
WDI (World Bank, 2012) and World Trade Indicators-WTI (World Bank, 2011) among 
others, to explore the relativity of countries agenda tilting towards free trade and 
protectionism. The influences of institutional framework, infrastructure, economic 
development and trade volume in determining countries’ tendencies for protectionism 
are also examined. The study employs descriptive, statistical and econometric analysis 
in estimating the data. This is with a view to underscoring how countries’ historical and 
development processes can influence policy mix especially with regards to the gliding 
towards free trade versus protectionism.	  
	  
2. Objectives of the Study	  
The main objective of the study is to empirically interrogate the argument for/against free 
trade and protectionism. The specific objectives include:	  
i. To document the free trade-protectionism inclination across the world.	  
ii. To investigate whether economic development of countries influence their 
tendencies for protectionism.	  
iii. To investigate how countries’ level of trade integration affects their inclination for 
protectionism.	  
iv. To explore how infrastructural facilities can impact on countries’ tendencies towards 
protectionism.	  
v. To find out how countries’ institutional framework influence their relativity towards 
protectionism.	  
vi. To underscore the impact of protectionism on a country and by inclination, Africa	  
	  
3. Stylized/Background Facts	  
The section presents and assesses the stance of free trade and protectionism. From the 
global perspective, the number of RTAs has witnessed substantial increase from 1948 to 
2011 as evidenced in Figure 3.1. The upsurge accelerated in the 1990s especially with 
the establishment of WTO in 1995. These agreements were expected to enhance trade 
by improving the opportunities with regards to market access of member countries.    	  
	  
5	  
Figure 3.1: Trend in Global Regional Trade Agreements (1948–2011)	  
	  
Source: WTO (2011) Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures	  
	  
The expectation of the increased RTAs is that member countries will increase their trade 
flows at least among members (intra-regional trade) by reducing or removing trade 
barriers. However, in some of the regions of the world especially the developing 
countries (e.g. SSA) the performance of trade has not substantially improved (UNCTAD, 
2012). For instance, assessing the value and share of merchandise export, Figure 3.2 
reveals that the merchandise export from SSA region was quite low compared to other 
regions.	  
	  
Figure 3.2: Values and shares of merchandise exports (1980-2010) USD current price	  
	  
Source: Authors’ computation from World Bank (2012) World Development Indicators	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The low performance of Africa in international trade can be traceable to a number of 
factors such as infrastructural development, economic development, geographical 
constraint, weak institutions, among others (Elbadawi, 1997; Ajakaiye and Oyejide 2005; 
Osabuohien and Efobi, 2011).  	  
	  
To this end, Table 3.1 documents per capita Gross Domestic Products (GDP). Evidence 
from Table3.1 shows that GDP per capita for the world has witnessed more than a 10-
fold increase between 1970 and 2010. The denotation of the above is that there has 
somewhat been an improvement in the global economy over the period. This pattern can 
also be observed for most other regions presented except for SSA where it was about 
six-fold. 	  
	  
  Table 3.1: GDP per Capita (Current USD) across the World	  
	   GDP Per Capita (Current USD)	  
Region	   1970	   1980	   1990	   2000	   2010	  
World	   784.61	   2480.73	   4157.69	   5302.91	   9227.95	  
EAP	   310.84	   1142.55	   2551.47	   3916.43	   7351.46	  
ECA	   1350.03	   5665.92	   10154.50	   11113.65	   22526.84	  
LAC	   611.31	   2127.27	   2622.86	   4105.90	   8822.25	  
MENA	   339.12	   2499.63	   2071.62	   3000.77	   6448.27	  
SSA	   217.84	   703.69	   587.78	   514.92	   1301.71	  
Authors’ compilation from World Development Indicators (2012)	  
	  
It can also be noted that in 2010, the values for SSA was more than seven times lower 
than the world average. Similarly, when comparing the region with East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, the value for Africa was slightly lower than EAP 
and MENA region, but was six times lower than ECA and close to three times lower than 
LAC.  This low value for SSA can be understood further by examining the quality of port 
infrastructure and institutions as reported in Table 3.2. 	  
	  
The reason for this is to assess the quality of port infrastructure, which is a significant 
component of international trade with respect to export and import, and institutions 
across the globe, which can possibly influence trade. The quality of port infrastructure 
(QOPI) is measured as an index from 1 to 7 (1 indicating extremely underdeveloped and 
7 denoting well developed and internationally efficient port). The quality of port 
infrastructure, which can facilitate trade, is rather poorly developed in Africa compared to 
other regions.	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Table 3.2 Quality of port infrastructure and Institutions	  
Quality of Port Infrastructure 
(QOPI)	  
Quality of Institutional Framework (QOIF)	  
	   2007	   2009	   2011	   2005	   2008	   2010	   2011	  
World	   4.03	   4.20	   4.25	   5.11	   5.40	   5.60	   5.92	  
EAP	   4.45	   4.54	   4.62	   5.63	   6.36	   6.71	   6.79	  
EAC	   4.30	   4.39	   4.45	   6.27	   6.55	   6.71	   6.71	  
LAC	   3.58	   3.90	   3.95	   4.97	   5.34	   5.41	   5.56	  
MENA	   4.31	   4.55	   4.55	   3.29	   3.37	   3.53	   3.53	  
SSA	   3.51	   3.71	   3.82	   4.42	   4.46	   4.65	   5.76	  
Notes: QOPI is an index that shows the level of port development with values ranging from 1-7, 
the greater the better; while QOIF  is measures the strength of legal rights with values between 0 
(worst scenario) and 10 (best scenario).	  
Source: Same as in Table 3.1	  
	  
As can be seen in Table3.2, the QOPI for SSA was lowest. In 2007, SSA’s value of 3.51 
was slightly lower than that of LAC (with the value of 3.58).  Though it increased to 3.71 
and 3.82 in 2009 and 2011, respectively, it was still lower than those of other regions 
and world average. 	  
	  
Also reported in Table 3.2 is the quality of institutional framework (QOIF) for the period 
2005-2011. This indicator is measured as the strength of legal rights with values 
between 0 (worst scenario) and 10 (best scenario indicating excellent QOIF). The values 
presented in Table 2.2revealed that for most of the periods, SSA performed lowest 
compared to other regions except for MENA. SSA’s QOIF experienced slight 
improvement in 2011 as the value of institutions in SSA improved more than LAC with a 
difference of 0.20. SSA’s institutional quality was still lower than that of EAP and ECA. 
From the foregoing discourse, Africa has rather low performance with regards to trade 
and other factors that can influence trade, notably: economic development, port 
infrastructure and institutional framework. This may be understood from the perspective 
that poor institutional framework can lead to bureaucratic delays, which increases cost of 
transaction and trading cost, and eventually inhibit trade flows (Ndomo, 2009; Djankov, 
Freund and Pham, 2010; Osabuohien and Efobi, 2011). 	  
	  
Furthermore, trade liberalising and protective measures across the globe are 
underscored in the study. From the GTA report (Evenett, 2011), the number of protective 
actions that can inhibit trade totalled about 1,593 that were implemented between the 
last quarter of 2008 and the last quarter of 2011, which represents annual average of 
about 531. Among the measures only 406can be said to trade liberalizing, representing 
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25.49%, while the rest187 representing 74.53% were measures that discriminate against 
trade as can be seen in Figure 3.3.	  
	  
	  
Figure 3.3: Protective and Liberalizing Measures	  
	  
Source: Adapted from GTA Report (2011) and Datt et al. (2011)	  
	  
In terms of the categories of trade restrictive measures, Figure 3.4 reports that 
temporary trade barriers, which entail ant-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards 
account for about 50.11%, tariff and non-tariff instruments account for 17.79% and 
32.10%, respectively. On the other hand, trade liberalizing measures include trade 
facilitation (accounting for 7.03%), tariff reductions (accounting over 75.23%) and non-
tariff measures (representing 17.74%).	  
	  
Figure 3.4:  Components of Protective and Liberalizing Measures	  
	  
Source: same as in Figure 3.3	  
	  
The reflection from the above is that tariff measures constitute the bulk of trade 
liberalizing measures, while temporary trade barriers are the major protectionism 
measures. This can be supported by the 2011 GTA report that reveals that over 66% 
(about Two-third) of new 132 entries relate to state measures that are likely (or almost 
certain)to increase the discrimination against some form of foreign commercial interests, 
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which was more than the 47 neutral or liberalising measures (Evenett, 2011). In terms of 
sectoral usage, agriculture accounts for 13% while industries’ products that were 
protected accounts for 87% (WTO, 2011).	  
	  
	  
4. Insights from Extant Studies	  
For several decades, the debate over free trade and protectionism has continued to be a 
discursive phenomenon. The proponents of free trade advocate a minimization of the 
restrictions to international trade in favour of openness and painless access to the global 
market. Protectionists on the other hand advocate national interest and economic 
welfare through regulating imports and market entry of other countries. Both theories 
have their pros and cons, but the choice between the two lies with the economy 
involved. It is essential to note that the plausibility of choosing either in absolute terms 
may prove a daunting and virtually impracticable task for any government, thereby giving 
rise to a mix of the two at varying levels.	  
Free trade by definition may be referred to as the absence of restrictions on the import 
and export of goods and services between countries, or a laissez-faire approach to 
international trade. It requires the integration of nations through a common market for 
the exchange of goods and services, and is an instrument which veers closely towards 
globalization (Maruping, 2005: Tilat, 2002).Trade is generally accepted as essential to a 
country’s growth and to some extent economic development, both on the demand and 
supply sides. This assertion stems from the empirical and theoretical studies of a 
number of academic scholars. Some of these include Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner 
(1995), Edwards (1997), and David and Scott (2005). Grossman and Helpman (1995) 
also revealed that world integration has an influence on entrepreneurs, and this results 
in a direct impact on the social structure of a country’s economic system. These findings 
amongst others emphasize the important role that trade liberalization plays in economic 
growth and development (Winters, 2004; Winters and Mackay, 2004). Krugman (1983) 
and Bhagwati (2004) further suggested that global trade has positive effects on 
economic development, particularly in the area of employment generation, poverty 
reduction, income re-distribution and economic growth.	  
	  
In the modern trade theory of Helpman and Krugman (1985) and the new growth theory 
of Grossman and Helpman (1991), it is postulated that the gains realized from trade 
makes free trade a significant tool for economic growth. Srinivasan (2000) and Stiglitz 
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(2002) further averred that in the case of developing countries, free trade brought about 
significant and substantial incentives. Maruping (2005) went on to explain that through 
trade, regional integration can enhance competition and provide access to wider 
markets; it can also be a useful tool in the trade of capital and labour across nations. 
More and more countries have therefore been embracing the idea of trade liberalization 
(through tariffs, duties and trade quotas reduction), and also jettisoning other apparent 
obstacles to free trade.	  
	  
Some cross-country empirical studies postulate that global trade liberalization has 
significant positive effects on the economic growth of countries (Osabuohien and 
Egwakhe, 2011). Solow (1956) likewise noted that market centred trade liberalization 
accelerates forcefully economic growth and development. Others provide a basis for 
trade liberalization and the propensity with which it is able to encourage economic 
growth (Berg and Krueger, 2003; Winters and Mackay, 2004). Winters and Mackay 
(2004), also indicated that capital and technological goods importation lead to a 
knowledge spill-over that enhances global competitiveness. Winters (2004) further 
revealed that a reduction in barriers to trade improves total factor productivity via a rise 
in import competition. This was confirmed by various studies carried out in Brazil, China, 
Latin America and South Africa (Ferriera and Rossi, 2001; Kraay, 1997; Aw, Chung, and 
Roberts 1999; Jonsson and Subramanian, 2001). However, these studies gave rise to 
the subject matter of whether local agricultural products and primary extractions exports 
in Africa is the alternative to tariff reduction (Osabuohien and Egwakhe 2011).	  
	  
Ornelas and Turner (2011), in their study revealed that one welfare implication of trade 
liberalization is that welfare rises as tariffs fall due to the regular mechanism of 
increasing imports. They suggested that although tariffs distort resource allocation as it 
drives a wedge between the cost of imports and the cost of domestic alternatives, the 
nature of the distortions may not be as astute as standard economic theory implies. 
They further assert that tariff distortions can improve overall economic welfare if they 
assist in economising transaction costs stemming from incomplete contracts.	  
	  
Conflicting evidences have been put forward in the study of the relationship trade 
liberalization has on economic growth and development (Ackah and Morrissey, 2010). 
Osabuohien and Egwakhe (2011) ascertained that, although Africa is becoming 
increasingly more integrated in trade and has reduced her tariffs consistently and 
remarkably, the continent has experienced less economically developed submitting that 
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increase in trade integration does not translate to economic development in Africa. 
Similarly, Tilat (2002) notes that trade has no significant relationship with long-term 
economic growth. He proffered that in the short-run, the negative effects of free trade 
out-weigh its benefits. But Winters and Mackay (2004) from their study deduced that 
trade liberalization is harmful to the poor in the short-run, while in the long-run, open 
economies may still find themselves falling below the poverty line.  Stiglitz (2002) who 
advocated free trade however advised against extreme or drastic trade openness. 	  
	  
The positive effects of international trade notwithstanding, most countries still engage in 
some sort of protectionism. As the governments seek to improve exports through 
supporting the domestic industries, it also seeks to safeguard other industries from the 
high level of competition and dumping issues that are associated with free trade. 
According to Milner and Yoffie (1989), a number of multinational companies advocate 
strategic trade policies. This means that they are willing to support free trade at home 
only if foreign markets are open or foreign markets reduce subsidies to their firms. The 
conundrum can be linked to the conflicting interests of countries, which will engender 
some level of controversy in the policies put in place to address such issues.	  
	  
Protectionism can be described as an attempt by the government of a country to impose 
or enact restrictions on the exchange of goods and services between itself and other 
nations of the world [George, 1949]. The philosophy underlining protectionism postulates 
that the regulation of international trade is vital in ensuring that markets function 
properly, which emanates from the fact that market inefficiencies can impede the 
benefits of international trade; thus, the need to provide ways of mitigating such 
inefficiencies (Investopedia.com, 2012)2. The implication of these market inefficiencies 
and loss of faith in free trade culminate in the persistence of protectionism (Bhagwati, 
2009). Some of the instruments used for protectionism include: tariffs, export subsidies, 
quotas, embargoes, exchange controls, import licensing, voluntary export restraint 
arrangements, and intellectual property laws such as patents and copyrights (Datt et al 
2011; Evenett, 2011; GTA, 2012).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Available	  at	  www.investopedia.com/articles/03/112503.ap#axzz1uVPIdXIS	  [Accessed	  
10th	  May,	  2012]	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The justifications proposed for employing protectionist measures include infant industry 
argument, import dumping, externalities, market failures and import controls, and non-
economic reasons. Infant industry argument is one the most widely adopted theories in 
support of protectionism (George, 1949). The belief here is that if foreign companies are 
allowed to ‘freely thrive’ in some industries, the competition will be too high for infant 
industries. These infant industries, which have the potential to develop and gain 
comparative advantage, would be limited in their ability to flourish beyond their foreign 
counterparts. Through protectionism, importation of de-merit goods such as alcohol, 
tobacco and narcotic drugs that have antagonistic effects can be controlled using high 
tariffs or imposing a ban (George, 1949).  Also, in a bid to guard unemployment levels, 
countries may shun over-specialization in goods in which they have comparative 
advantage as a structural decline emanating from new international competition can lead 
to rises in unemployment levels in the domestic economy.	  
	  
Protectionism not new par se, as it dates to the 17thcentury with the enactment of the 
Sugar Act of 1764 and the Stamp Act of 1765. The Sugar Act levied duties on imported 
sugar, molasses, wine and other commodities, while the Stamp Act levied taxes on all 
important almanacs, documents, periodicals, pamphlets and playing cards. The 
colonialists found these taxations groundless as they advocated a rule of “no taxation 
without due representation”. These protectionist measures instigated an uprising that led 
to the American Revolution3. In 1929, USA passed the Smooth-Hawley Trade Act which 
increased tariffs on more than 3000 products by 60% and about 60 countries took 
retaliatory measures of tariffs and this doubled the world average level of protection, 
partly accounting for the 70% decline in world trade by 1933 (Irwin, 1998).	  
	  
The effects of protectionism in recent times may not be as palpably lethal as that of the 
17th century or 1929-1933, but it still has perturbing consequences. Protectionism is 
deemed harmful to consumers as both tariff and non-tariff barriers impose taxes on the 
domestic consumers, usually through regressive means, thereby hurting the poor more 
than the rich in the society. It creates market distortions which take place in the form of 
higher prices for goods and services, and reduction in market access for producers. It 
leads to loss of economic welfare of consumers through high prices and restricted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Available	  at	  www.wowessays/dbase/ab5/lvt151.shtml	  [Accessed	  May	  10th,	  2012].	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consumer choice. It also brings about regressive effects on the distribution of income by 
imposing tariffs on products majorly consumed by lower income households, thereby 
encouraging inequality in the allocation of resources (DTI, 2004). 	  
	  
Protectionism can introduce production inefficiencies as domestic firms that enjoy 
protection from competition may have a lackadaisical attitude towards reducing 
production costs. It also provides little protection for employment. This is because in the 
long-run, tariffs and other barriers to trade (which protectionists argue help to protect 
low-skilled workers of industries facing grim international competition), are found to be 
ineffective, inefficient and possessing high-level opportunity costs (DTI, 2004).Another 
argument against protectionism is that it can promote negative multiplier effects where 
trade disputes adversely affect trade volumes, leading to negative outcomes for 
countries. It may also trigger higher taxes and higher prices by imposing a double 
burden on tax payers and consumers. Protectionism can instigate trade wars in the form 
of retaliatory measures of other countries, which give rise to a decrease in the volume of 
world trade and an increase in the cost of importing new technology. However, Boffa and 
Olarreaga (2012) attempted to explore the extent to which the adoption of protectionist 
measures led to retaliation by other countries after the global financial crises of 2008. 
Using a linear probability model with fixed effects (which showed similar results to the 
ones obtained with the logit model) on data from the GTA database, they found no 
evidence of retaliatory measures from countries that had been recipients of protectionist 
measures. 	  
	  
National regulations and standards in international trade are expected to be typically 
motivated in line with national interest. It entails the removal of excessive technical 
barriers to trade within the RTAs, which requires harmonization or mutual 
acknowledgement of product standards and testing procedures between countries. This 
may be to ensure the quality of products, protect consumer health, food safety and the 
environment, or to reinforce social responsibility. While the developed countries have 
better symmetry of information and possess the necessary infrastructural and regulatory 
frameworks to support these requirements, many developing countries especially those 
in SSA do not have such luxury, thereby making testing, quality assurance, calibration, 
certification, accreditation and standardization difficult. Furthermore, domestic industries 
and importers are unable to fully comply with the technical requirements as they incur 
high transaction costs, especially for exporters (Meyer et al, 2009). This in turn reduces 
the capacity for most developing countries to participate effectively in the global market.	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Internationally, it has been asserted that protectionism has more unfavourable effects to 
developing countries than favourable ones. The United Nations recently indicated that 
EU protectionism deprives developing countries of nearly USD700 billion export income 
a year (Landis, 2010). There is also an on-going dispute on the linking of Human Rights 
Violations to Trade Restrictions between USA and Russia as the US Congress 
disagrees over plans to normalize trade relations due to Russia’s human rights record. 
Restoring permanent normal trade relations with Russia will require the US Congress to 
repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which is a Cold-War era piece of legislation 
aimed at countries that restrict the freedom of emigration (ICTSD, 2012c).	  
	  
According to Fatman (2012), Geographical Indication (GI) protection (which refers to a 
proper name or a sign that identifies a certain product which has a specific geographical 
location such as a province, a town, or a country), can result in missed economic 
opportunities. This can occur where there is new technology available that can lead to a 
more cost efficient production process, or where the preferences of consumers change 
over time. The resultant effect is that GI certified farmers may be unable to adapt the 
new production process that is required to meet the demands of consumers. In contrast 
to this, GIs are considered beneficial in protecting an established reputation against 
misuse by imitators, and serve as a useful tool to enter certain commodity markets. 
Fatman (2012) further postulated that GI protection in developing countries could play an 
important role in economic development by linking rural communities to commercial 
markets via the agricultural sector. This implies that an absolute move towards free trade 
is hardly feasible as there will continue to be contentions that necessitate a level of 
protectionism.	  
	  
Recently, the WTO’s highest court ruled that the US “dolphin-safe” label violates WTO’s 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). According to the judges, the label 
discriminates against Mexican tuna by banning a fishing practice known as “purse-seine” 
nets. These are encircling nets that temporarily set on dolphins to attract the tuna that 
swim below, and are used almost exclusively by Mexican fisheries (ICTSD, 2012d). The 
implication of such a label is that it increases market share for the dolphin-safe US 
industries, while decreasing the market share of the non-dolphin-safe Mexican fish 
farmers.	  
	  
15	  
Some commentators have mentioned the effect of the recent increase in protective 
measures. For instance, during the G-20 meeting of world Trade Ministers, the WTO 
Director-General cautioned against protectionism (ICTSD, 2012e). Similarly, the 
Mexican economy minister also referred to protectionist measures aimed at restricting 
imports as ‘shooting oneself in the foot’ noting that protectionism could act as a handicap 
for domestic companies by a displacement from global value chains. While the Chinese 
minister of commerce added that authorities need to maintain a high level of vigilance 
against protectionism (ICTSD, 2012e). The above is crucial as it has been noted that 
towards the end of 2011, about 1,243 new measures had been initiated since 2008 
global financial crises where 900 these were trade restrictive, while another 327 were 
responsible for the decrease in the level of import protection (Datt et al, 2011). 	  
	  
5. Analytical Underpinnings	  
The main argument in this study is not for or against trade nor protection, but the reason 
why countries’ national policies regarding trade seems to be at variance with some 
international trade protocols and guidelines. Some scholars (Dollar, 1992; Winters, 2004; 
Winters and Mackay, 2004etc) have argued for free trade (or better put, trade 
liberalization), which is usually characterized with the removal of possible trade 
constraints to boost the trade flow and economic performance (Osabuohien and 
Egwakhe, 2011). While another set of scholars (e.g. Winters and Mackay, 2004; 
Fatman, 2012 etc) have noted that developing countries need some degrees of 
protection to reach some growth threshold as domestic firms may not have the ‘muscles’ 
(technical, financial, economic) to compete favourably in the international market. 	  
	  
The reality of this is that even the developed countries and emerging market economies 
are also involved in one form of protection or the other (Datt et al 2011). This was 
brought to limelight at the recent global financial crises. For instance, it has been 
observed that geographical indications of agricultural products and foodstuffs are 
protected through Protected Designations of Origin (PDOs) and Protected Geographical 
Indications (PGIs) in Europe, which are based on EU’s GI legislation that are operational 
within the EU and some non-EU developed countries (EU, 2004; Fatman, 2012). The 
adoption of a given standard, which is a form of protection, can have some benefits 
(positive trickle down) and costs (negative effect) on trade and other macroeconomic 
performance indicators. For instance, the impact of ISO 9000 (a set of international 
standards, which provides requirements for creating and maintaining company quality 
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systems) was assessed in Mauritius by Kawthar and Vinesh (2011) and it was reported 
that the benefits/cost have internal, external and financial dimensions.  	  
	  
The external benefits reflect in the market such as increase in market share, access to 
new markets, being able to export to some markets which were previously closed due to 
the existence of TBT and customer satisfaction (Casadesus, Gimenez and Heras, 2001). 
The internal benefits can come in the form of increased production, better competitive 
advantage, reduction in cost and personnel motivation, among others. Kawthar and 
Vinesh (2011) noted that in Mauritius the mean sales of ISO certified companies were 
greater than non-ISO certified between 2000 and 2009. The authors also observed 
positive and significant relationship between ISO 9000 certification and sales. However, 
it could be argued that the companies that will likely get certified are naturally stronger in 
terms of size, finance, technology and management, which also mean better market 
performance. Thus, the greater sales may be a reflection of stronger companies, which 
might have contributed to adoption of the certification.	  
	  
In a study by Mezher and Ramadan (1999), the state of ISO 9001: 2000 certification was 
conducted using 32 Saudi manufacturing firms. It was found that the major benefits that 
accrued to the firms include the improvement of customer service and firm’s efficiency. 
However, there are a number of barriers including high cost of implementation, 
inadequate full commitment of top management, dearth of human and financial 
resources, employee resistance, no perceived advantage in certification of the service 
industry, among others (Quazi and Padibjo, 1998; Kawthar and Vinesh 2011)). The 
implication of this is that the implementation of such standards will depend on whether 
the anticipated benefits are at least greater than the associated costs of designing, 
implementing and maintaining the system (Nwankwo, 2005). This is very much similar to 
the La Porta et al (1999) theory of institutional development, where it posits that 
economic institutions can only be made when the costs is at least less than the benefits 
of its adoption (Osabuohien and Efobi, 2011).	  
	  
Stemming from the above, this study epitomizes the underpinning factor that makes the 
tendency of countries tilting towards greater protection or less protection. This is shown 
in Figure 5.1.	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From Figure 5.1, the more diverse the national interest is to international protocol, the 
more protective measures a country will impose with a view to protecting the interests of 
the citizenry as against adhering to international guidelines. This will occur at segment C 
in the figure. On the other hand, the closely related a country’s national interest is to 
international protocols the less protective the country will be and as a result, the less 
restrictive trade will become, which occurs in segment A. The question is why should a 
country’s national interest differ from international protocols or agreements? The 
response to this is that the international protocol/agreements seek the general (average) 
welfare of all the constituting members, while the national interest is majorly for the 
citizenry whose interest the national leaders have ‘sworn’ to uphold. Another reason that 
can be advanced is that international agreements will be more encompassing based on 
the number of countries involved and may entail broader issues relating to more bundles 
of goods and services. Thus, the gliding from segment A to C or vice versa will depend 
on a number of factors. Besides the anticipated costs and benefits mentioned earlier, the 
level of economic development, institutional factors, historical background and trading 
partners will likely contribute to the gliding process. Hence, it is not too surprising that 
emerging economies such as BRICS are able to tackle the protection tactics of 
developed countries such as USA and some EU countries (WTO, 2011; GTA, 2012). 
This is evidenced in a number of suit cases at the WTO brought about by the BRICS 
against developed countries.	  
	  
Segments B and D have same connotation as moderate protection will occur given high 
international agreement and low national interest, and vice versa. Another reason is that 
some of the protective measures are revenue sources to national governments. In effect, 
import duties and export taxes are significant components of their revenue especially for 
developing countries as they accounted for 24.5% and 35.5% of total tax revenue in 
South Asia and SSA countries, respectively. Thus, to jettison them in ‘the name of free 
trade’ is to lose a large proportion of revenue base. Even from the global stand point, the 
duties were as much as 13.52% and contributed to 10.68%, 10.70% and 14.10% of the 
tax revenues in MENA, LAC and EAP regions, respectively (World Bank, 2011).	  
	  
6. Methods of Analysis and Empirical Model	  
This study engages descriptive, statistical and econometric techniques in achieving its 
objectives. The descriptive analysis explores content analysis of GTA data. It employs 
tabular and graphical illustrations to analyse the different trade and protective measures 
adopted by countries especially for the period 2009-2012. The statistical analysis reports 
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the summary statistics of the explanatory variables including trade integration, 
institutional quality, infrastructural quality and economic development.  On the other 
hand, econometric analysis formulates an empirical model that expresses countries’ 
tendency to protect as a function of institutional quality, infrastructural quality and 
economic development as well as trade integration. 	  
	  
The content analysis approach was employed and the data on protectionism was 
sourced from the Global Trade Alert (GTA) data set. The GTA data set documents 
policies taken by countries, which is likely to hamper the operations of free trade around 
the world. The dataset documents real time policies of countries relating to their trade 
policies. The dataset covers the period 2009 to 2012 and includes trade policies relating 
to tariff and non-tariff measures, public procurement and policies on migration, export 
subsidy and other service sector, trade defense measure, sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
(SPS) measures, consumption subsidy, public procurement, intellectual property 
protection, TBT, investment measure, import ban, state trading enterprise, local content 
requirement, export taxes, bail out, import licences, quota, competitive devaluation, trade 
finance and sub-national government measures. The GTA dataset includes measures 
relating to different countries of the world.  This study selected 107 countries based on 
countries that have at least one form of protective measures during the period of study 
(see the list in the Appendix).	  
	  
The policies and actions are categorized into three broad groups:  Red, Amber and 
Green. The red category includes those actions that are certainly discriminatory and 
which have a drastic effect on free trade. The amber categories include those policies 
and actions whose discriminatory impacts are not certain. This implies that these policies 
and actions are likely to hamper free trade, but the degree of such an effect on free trade 
is not certain. The green category includes those policies and measures that support 
free trade and are obviously anti-protectionism. This study categorized measures for red 
and amber as protectionism. Similar studies such as Evenett (2011) adopted a related 
approach to evaluate the extent of trade tensions mounting as a result of the global 
financial crises.  	  
	  
This study observes that a country will tend to engage in protectionist activities when 
their national interest takes paramount priority over treaties and trade agreement they 
may have entered into with other countries in the past. Basically, the study proposes that 
institutional factors and economic development among others, can explain the countries 
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tendencies to engage in protective actions. This implies that the possibility that country 
‘Yi’ will engage in a protectionist action (Yi ˃ 0) or not (Yi = 0) is given by:	  
P (Yi = 1/y) = {Πi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  y=01-­‐Πi	  	  	  	  if	  	  	  	  y	  ˃	  0	  	  	              (1)	  
	  
Where Πi is the probability that country ‘i’ decides not to put in place a protectionist 
measure that can hinder free trade based on a set of covariates Xit  for which the linear 
relationship can be expressed using a logistic regression framework. Thus, this is 
represented in equation (2) as:	  
	  Logit	  Πit=ln1-­‐ΠitΠit=Xitα	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	  
	  
In this equation, α is a vector of parameters to be estimated, while Xit is a combination of 
the explanatory variables, which include the quality of institutions, infrastructure 
development, economic development variables as well as dummy variables signifying 
the founding members of WTO, developing countries and African countries. Explicitly, 
the econometric model developed for this study is expressed in equation (3) as;	  
	  
P (Yit = 1/y) =β0i +β1Edevit + β2Infrait + β3Instqit + β4Trdintit+β5dumJi +µit    
 (3)	  
The probability of a country engaging in protective action is the dependent variable and 
measured as a categorical variable. One (1) was attributed to a country with high rate of 
protective measure and zero (0) if otherwise. A country is regarded as having a high 
measure of protectionism if in a particular year the protective measure engaged by the 
country is above the simple average of the total measures engaged by the countries 
reported in the GTA dataset. The simple average was first computed by dividing the total 
measures of all protective actions taken by all the countries in a particular year by the 
number of countries reported in that year. Then the number of measures taken by each 
country was compared with the average and any country with protective measures more 
than the absolute average was categorized as 1 and otherwise 0 for the period (2009-
2010)4. This is summarized in Table 6.1.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
  Values on measures of protection for 2011 are in GTA dataset, however, those for the explanatory 
variables in WDI and WGI ended in 2010. Hence, this study used 2009 and 2010 to have the same period. 
This differs markedly from Boffa and Olarreaga (2012) that related data from GTA covering measures 
between November 2008 and December 2010 to averages of explanatory variables from 2004 to 2006.	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Table 6.1 Dichotomization of the Dependent Variable	  
Year	   Number of 
protective 
measures	  
Number of 
countries	  
Simple average	  
2009	   615	   86	   7.15 measures	   	  
2010	   606	   106	   6.00 measures	   	  
  	  
From Table 6.1, countries with average measures that are ≥ 7 in 2009 are categorized 
as 1 (0, otherwise), while in 2010, countries with average measures that ≥ 6 are 
categorized as 1 (0, otherwise). The reason for this cut-off point is that countries that 
have average measures that are greater than the global average measure can be said to 
have relatively high tendency for protectionism. The above dichotomization approach is 
with a view to apply analysis that deals with categorical dependent variable such as 
logistic regression and social network. A similar approach (though with trade relations) 
has been used by Kim and Shin (2002) within the context of Social Network Analysis to 
explain longitudinal data on international commodity trade between 105 countries (1959-
1996) using cut-off points of USD 1 million and USD 10 million.	  
	  
The independent variables include: 	  
Edev:  economic development measured as GDP growth rate (gdpgrw) and life 
expectancy at birth (Lifexp)5. 	  
Infra:  infrastructural development measured as logistics performance index (logistics). 
The logistics measures the performance of the country with regards to trade 
logistics as reflected in the overall logistic index, showing the average of the 
country scores on the efficiency of the clearance process. This includes border 
control agencies (e.g. customs), the quality of trade and transport related 
infrastructures (e.g. rail, road, information technology), ease of arranging 
competitively priced shipments, competence and quality of logistics services, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	  Attempt	  was	  made	  to	  include	  measures	  such	  as	  educational	  attainment	  to	  capture	  level	  
of	  human	  capital	  development;	  however,	  the	  data	  were	  not	  available	  for	  most	  countries	  for	  
2009	  and	  2010.	  Also,	  the	  per	  capita	  GDP	  and	  its	  logarithmic	  transformation	  was	  first	  included	  in	  
the	  model,	  however	  there	  was	  no	  much	  difference	  in	  the	  regression.	  Hence,	  it	  was	  dropped.	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ability to track and trace consignments, and the timeliness of shipments (World 
Bank, 2012). The value ranges from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest)6. 	  
Instq:  institutional quality, which captures the quality of institution in a country. As 
reported in World Governance Indicators (WGI), there are six indicators 
including: government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), voice and 
accountability (VA), rule of law (RL), political stability and absence of violence 
(PS), and control of corruption (CC). However, this study used four of them (GE, 
RQ, RL and PS) as they provide insight on the process of international relations 
especially with third party dealings. The data were obtained from WGI as 
computed by Kaufmann et al (2010). These indicators are standardized on a 
scale from -2.5 (lowest) to +2.5 (highest). Other indicators of Instq engaged are 
from Freedom House (2011), namely: political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). 
The choice of PR and CL is to complement those of WGI and most importantly it 
covers a recent period (2009 and 2010 inclusive). The original values range from 
1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7 (the least). However, this study transformed 
the data such that higher values indicate better institutional quality. This is to aid 
interpretation of results as all other variables are in ascending order. 	  
Trdint: trade integration measured as the difference between export and import and 
scaled by GDP [i.e. (X-M)/GDP]. 	  
DumJ dummy variables (with superscript ‘J’= 1-3), which include: 1) WTO founding 
member (WTOfnmb) dichotomized as 1 for countries that are WTO members 
since inception in 1995 and 0 otherwise as reported in WTO (2012).  2) 
Developing country dummy (Developing) as derived using the UNCTAD’s 
classification based to assign 1 if a country is a developing economy and 0 
otherwise. 3) African countries (Africdum) obtained by assigning 1 to African 
countries and 0 to non-African countries. 	  
	  
On the other hand, the implication of protectionism was investigated using two empirical 
models gleaning on the endogenous growth model and the new trade theory. This is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	  Efforts	  were	  made	  to	  include	  other	  indicators	  of	  infrastructure	  such	  as:	  paved	  roads,	  
electricity	  power	  consumption,	  telecommunication	  usage	  (internet,	  telephone	  and	  personal	  
computer	  users	  per	  100	  persons),	  however,	  data	  on	  them	  were	  not	  available	  for	  most	  of	  the	  
countries	  in	  2009	  and	  2010	  in	  WDI.	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refletive in the choice of explanatory variables for the models apart from the variable of 
focus (i.e. extent of protective measure engaged by the country in a particular period).   
Thus, the models 4 and 5:	  
Yit = β0 + β1Protctit + β2Labit + β3Kapit + β4inflation + ϱ1it    
 (4)	  
Trdit = ƛ0 + ƛ1Protctit + ƛ2 Exrit + ƛ3Kapit + ƛ4Labit + ϱ2it    
 (5)	  
Where:	  
Y: per capita income growth rate.	  
Trd: trade balance (measured as export minus import divided GDP).	  
Protct: extent of protective measures (proxied by proportion of red to total measure as 
reported in GTA dataset). The GTA dataset provides information on 
contemporary protectionism actions and these actions are categorised into three 
colours (Red, Amber and Green). The Red includes measures that have been 
implemented and may involve discrimination or have been announced/under 
consideration, but if implemented will certainly restrict trade. Amber involves 
measures that are implemented/already announced and if implemented the 
resultant impact on trade is not certain. The Green includes measures that have 
been announced/implemented that support free trade (GTA, 2012).  	  
Lab: total labour force.	  
Exr:  exchange rate 	  
Kap: capital captured as the annual growth rate of the gross fixed capital formation.	  
Inflation: consumer prices (annual %).	  
e:  error term.	  
it: country and time dimensions (105 countries from 2009-2010).	  
β, and ƛ : coefficients of the explanatory variables in models.	  
	  
This study engaged data for 105 countries and African sample, comprising of 25 
countries as informed by GTA dataset. Other source of data was World Development 
Indicators-WDI (World Bank, 2012). Model 4 and 5 engaged the Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS) technique, which is a type of Generalised Least Squares suitable in 
handling the problem of heteroscedasticity in a short panel data (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009)7. The analysis was performed with the aid of STATA 11.1 software. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
  The WLS is appropriate when the variance of the error term of the sampled countries (i) for the 
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7.0 Empirical Results and Discussions	  
The section presents some empirical results based on data analysed using GTA dataset, 
WDI, WGI and Freedom House. The model formulated in equation (3) was estimated 
using logistic regression (logit) with the aid of STATA 11.1 software. The choice of this is 
that the model involves a categorical dependent variable (Baum, 2006; Long and 
Freese, 2006).	  
	  
7.1 Content Analysis using GTA Data	  
This sub-section presents the various categories of GTA data on the measures that 
could be trade liberalising and protective. Figure 7.1 presents the various actions 
implemented by countries during the period as presented by the GTA data. From the 
figure, the proportion of measures that can liberalise trade (green) implemented by 
countries increased from 18.21% in 2009 to 27.48% but later decreased to 26.63% in 
2011.  Measures that the effects on trade are not certain (amber) ranged from 21.90% to 
30.47% for the period. For measures that are certainly protective (red) as percentage to 
total measures remained considerably higher than other measures. It was close to 60% 
in 2009, about 50% in 2010 and 42.90% in 2011. In effect, this study observed that the 
measures in a given year, was higher than those reported in Figure 7.1 as previous 
years’ measures will have cumulative effect in the current year. For instance, a ‘face 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
period (t) is not constant. And in this case, the countries included as sample will have their explanatory 
variables assuming diverse values. Thus, the problem of heteroscedasticity will arise.  Furthermore, the 
WLS is an efficient method used for short panel data. This study employed WLS for the estimation process. 
Efforts were made to use dynamic panel data model with a view to handling the issue of endogeneity but it 
was observed that the process would considerably reduce the degree of freedom given the short time 
dimension.  Each term in the WLS method includes an additional weight that determines the extent each 
observation in the data set can influence the final parameter estimates.  Therefore, using weights that are 
inversely proportional to the variance at each level of the explanatory variables yields the most precise 
parameter estimates. The study used the per unit error variances of the series as automatically generated the 
system, thereby reducing the possibility of the problem of heteroscedasticity. 	  
  The mathematical representation of the WLS is represented as:	  	   i=1n(yi*-a.zi-b.xi*)2= i=1n(yi-a-b.xi)2hi      (3) 	  	   yi*	  is	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  xi*	  are	  the	  sets	  of	  explanatory	  variables,	  while	  	  zi	  is	  a	  
vector.	  The	  WLS	  will	  involve	  the	  minimisation	  of	  equation	  (3)	  by	  scaling	  the	  squared	  residuals	  for	  
the	  observations	  with	  proportion	  to	  the	  variances.	  With	  this,	  a	  best	  linear	  unbiased	  estimate	  
and	  correct	  standard	  errors	  for	  coefficient	  estimates	  are	  expected.	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value’ of 50% observed for 2010 for protective measures is actually higher as those 
measures implemented in 2009 will also be effective in 2010.	  
   	  
	  
	  
Figure 7.1 Trade Liberalising and Protective Measures as % of Total (2009-2011)	  
	  
	  
Source: Authors’ computation	  
	  
In addition to the above, the details on the respective protective measures for the period 
2009 to 2011 are reported in Figure 7.2.	  
	  
Figure 7.2  Protective measures used in relation to total measures (2009-2011)	  
	  
	  
Note: ‘Others’ in the graph include: SPS; Consumption subsidy; Intellectual property protection; 
TBT; State trading enterprise; Import licences; Quota; Competitive devaluation; Trade finance; 
Import subsidy; and Sub-national government measure.	  
Source: Authors’ computation.	  
	  
As can be observed from Figure 7.2 trade defence mechanism and bailout remained 
most of the widely used measures. For instance in 2009 and 2011, trade defence 
measure constituted up to 25% of the total measures. Another important measure that is 
evidenced from the figure is tariff and non-tariff measures that accounted for about 
14.23% and 13.88% of the total measures. 	  
	  
After establishing that protective actions by countries have increased since 2008, the 
study also examined the different instruments of protectionism in the first quarter of 
2012. From Table 7.1, the total number of protective instruments used by countries as at 
the first quarter of 2012 was 67. The most frequently used of the measures reported was 
bailout and trade defence tactics, which accounted for over 74% of the total protective 
measures.	  
	  
Table 7.1  Protective Measures Adopted in 1st Quarter 2012	  
Type of 
Measure 	  
Tariff	   Non-Tariff	   OSS	   TDM	   TBT	   STE	   Export Taxes	  Total	  
No. of 
Measure
s	  
1	   3	   2	   28	   2	   6	   3	  67	  
25	  
% of 
Total	  
1.49	   4.48	   2.99	   41.79	   2.99	   8.96	   4.48	  100.00	  
Note: OSS: other service sector; TDM: Trade defence measure; TBT: Technical barriers to 
trade; STE: State trading enterprise.	  
Source: Authors’ computation.	  
	  
7.2 Statistical Analysis	  
The summary statistics of the variables (except for those that are categorical) are 
presented in the Table 7.2a. This is to give an overview of the variables that are in the 
model before the econometric analysis. 	  
	  
Table 7.2a  Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables	  
Variables	   Mean	   Min	   Max	   Observations	  
Lifexp	   70.58	   46.96	   82.93	   212	  
Gdpgrw	   1.87	   -17.95	   20.40	   207	  
logisticso
v	  
2.98	   1.21	   4.19	   199	  
Trdint	   -0.04	   -0.74	   0.30	   198	  
PS	   -0.14	   -2.50	   1.44	   214	  
GE	   0.19	   -1.72	   2.29	   212	  
RQ	   0.18	   -2.06	   1.90	   212	  
RL	   0.09	   -1.91	   1.97	   212	  
PR	   4.81	   1.00	   7.00	   212	  
 CL	   4.94	   1.00	   7.00	   212	  
Source: Authors’ computation	  
	  
From Table 7.2a, the economic development variables (life expectancy and GDP growth 
rate) show that on the average, the expected life span of the citizens of the sampled 
countries was 71 years old approximately. The country with the highest life expectancy 
had a life expectancy value of approximately 83 years, while the one with the lowest had 
a value of 47 years approximately. The average GDP growth rate of the sampled 
countries was 1.87%, which ranges between            -17.95% and 20.40%. The results 
from Table 7.2a show that the mean value for logistic performance was 2.98. The 
difference between the highest performing country and lowest performing country with 
regards to this measure is 2.98 as the minimum and maximum values are 1.21 and 4.19, 
respectively. This shows that there is a disparity between the infrastructural capacities of 
the countries used for the study. 	  
	  
26	  
The indicators of institutional quality as reported in Table 7.2a, show that the mean 
values of institutional quality for those WGI are -0.14, 0.19, 0.18 and 0.09 for PS, GE, 
RQ and RL, respectively on a scale of -2.5 and +2.5. The minimum and maximum 
values range between -2.50 and 2.29.  The other measures of institution (political rights-
PR and civil liberty-CL) show that on the average, the sampled countries performed fairly 
well, with average values of 4.81 and 4.94. Some of the countries had values as high as 
7, while some had values as poor as 1. The difference between the country with the best 
form of political right and civil liberty and the worst form of the same measure was 6.   	  
	  
Further statistical description of the variables was done using the correlation test to 
investigate the bivariate associations that may exist between the variables, which were 
reported in Table 7.2b. 	  
Table 7.2b Statistical Analysis using Correlation Test	  
	   Protect	   Lifexp	   gdpgrw	   Logisticsov	   Trdint	   PS	  RQ	   RL	   PR1	   CL1	  
Protect	   1.00	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  
Lifexp	   0.09	   1.00	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  
Gdpgrw	   0.03	   -0.37	   1.00	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  
logisticso
v	  
0.21	   0.67	   -0.27	   1.00	   	   	  	   	   	   	  
Trdint	   0.20	   0.45	   -0.14	   0.46	   1.00	   	  	   	   	   	  
PS	   -0.11	   0.44	   -0.38	   0.54	   0.31	   1.00	  	   	   	   	  
GE	   0.00	   0.71	   -0.34	   0.80	   0.44	   0.71	  	   	   	   	  
RQ	   -0.01	   0.65	   -0.42	   0.77	   0.41	   0.71	  1.00	   	   	   	  
RL	   0.02	   0.68	   -0.36	   0.83	   0.42	   0.76	  0.90	   1.00	   	   	  
PR	   0.01	   0.48	   -0.37	   0.51	   0.30	   0.57	  0.73	   0.69	   1.00	   	  
CL	   -0.02	   0.51	   -0.43	   0.55	   0.31	   0.67	  0.79	   0.74	   0.94	   1.00	  
Source: Authors’ computation	  
	  
From the Table, the variables for economic development (GDP growth rate and life 
expectancy), had a positive association with the probability of a country engaging in a 
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protective action. Similarly, the Table shows that a country with better infrastructure 
(logistic performance) and trade integration will likely engage in a protective action. This 
is evidenced by the positive association between the variables (Protect, logisticsov and 
Trdint). The institutional quality variables show mixed evidence as some of the variables 
(GE, RL and PR) were positively associated with the likelihood of a country engaging in 
protective actions, while the others (PS, RQ and CL) were negatively signed. 	  
	  
Inference is not drawn from the correlation analysis due to the fact that it is a bivariate 
form of analysis. At any rate, the test implies that there is no issue of multicollinearity 
particularly given the understanding that the respective indicators of institutional quality 
and economic development are taken in step-wise. This is in contrast to the model 
developed for this study, which was in multivariate form. The logistic regression was 
used to draw inference with regards to the relationship existing between the variables. 	  
	  
7.3 Econometric Analysis	  
The empirical analysis is grouped into two: the factors informing protective actions by 
countries and the implication of such protective actions. The first stage reports the result 
obtained from the logistic regression for the estimation of equation (3) as specified in 
section 6.2. The results are reported in Tables 7.3a and 7.3b, using indicators of 
economic development and other explanatory variables accordingly. From the Tables, 
the test statistics presented in the last segments such as the Pseudo R2 and their 
various probability values are statistically significant. This underscores that the chosen 
explanatory variables are jointly significant in explaining the likelihood of a country 
engaging in a protective action. This means that the estimations can be relied upon for 
useful inferences. 	  
	  
From Table 7.3a, it could be observed that using life expectancy (lifeexp) as indicator of 
economic development, there is a likelihood that less developed countries have higher 
tendencies of engaging in trade protective measures as reflected from the negative 
signs of the variable in all the columns (I,...,X). However, this variable was significant 
only in columns I and IX. A close investigation of table 7.3b reveals that using the growth 
rate of GDP as indicator of economic development, the variable has mixed signs as in 
columns I-IV it was negative, while in columns V-X it was positive, but was not significant 
in any of the columns. This suggests that neither a country’s economic size nor the level 
of development will necessarily create or induce its tendency to protect.  This picture 
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becomes clearer on the examination of developing country dummy in both tables, as the 
variable had a positive value, which was not significant at 10%. 	  
	  
Table 7.3a Logistic Regression using Life Expectancy	  
Dependent Variable: Tendency of Country 
Engaging in Protective Action	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Source: Authors’ computation.	  
	  
Some authors like Tilat (2002) and Osabuohien and Egwakhe (2011) support this 
position based on their argument that trade relations and economic development may 
have no significant relationship. Similarly, Milner and Yoffie (1989) noted that the levels 
of economic condition are not necessarily the reason for neither protectionism nor free 
trade. This implies that a country will tend to engage in a protective action not 
necessarily because of the buoyancy of its economy. More evidently was the scenario 
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from the global financial crises, where countries at different levels of development were 
engaged in protectionist actions irrespective of their levels of development (Datt et al. 
2011). Thus, it could be said that there are other salient and crucial factors that tend to 
make a country engage in protective measures other than its level of development. 	  
Table 7.3b Logistic Regression using Economic growth rate	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Note: Probability values are in parenthesis. Superscripts a,b and c represent significant at 1, 5 
and 10%.	  
Source: Authors’ computation.	  
	  
In view of this, this study investigates other explanatory variables that are reported in the 
Tables 7.3a and 7.3b. Most importantly, the respective institutional variables using those 
of WGI (PS, GE, RQ, RL) and Freedom House (Pr and Cl) are all negatively signed, 
indicating that countries with weaker institutions tend to relatively protect more than 
those with stronger institutions. This is re-echoed as almost all the indicators of 
institutional variables in both Tables are statistically significant at 1% and 5%, except PR 
36	  
in column V of Table 7.3a. This denotes that institutional quality in a country is a crucial 
determining factor in the relativity of a country’s inclination towards protectionism. The 
implication of this finding is that as a country’s institutional quality improves, the 
likelihood of being protective will become slimmer.  This may be justified based on the 
fact that the quality of a country’s institutions will be able to guide and guard the 
economic activities of the country without resorting to external mechanisms. 	  
	  
A further investigation of the components of the institutional quality variables using WGI 
reveals that government effectiveness (GE) is most relevant in determining the likelihood 
of a country’s protection, which is followed by rule of law (RL), regulatory quality (RQ) 
and political stability (PS).  The indicator of infrastructural development was positive and 
significant in all the columns with the exception of column IX in Table 7.3b. This 
suggests that infrastructural development in the country with regards to the logistic 
performance has a bearing on the tendency of a country to protect. This implies that the 
better the country’s infrastructure in terms of logistics performance, the higher the 
likelihood of the country to engage in a protective act. This is expected as countries with 
better infrastructure are already being ‘patronized’ by other countries in terms of trade 
relations. This is because better infrastructure would reduce the costs of trade by the 
relating country. In this regard, the country can have the audacity to engage in 
protectionist actions bearing in mind that the relating country may not necessarily back 
out because of the attendant low cost incurred in trading with them. This is unlike the 
country with poor infrastructural facility, which hitherto has been experiencing ‘epileptic’ 
trade relations with other countries because of the high cost of trading with them. Such 
countries may not have the will power to engage in protective actions.  	  
	  
The trade integration (tdint) variable was significant and positive in most of the columns, 
giving a kind of paradoxical scenario that the more a country engages in trade, the more 
likely it is to protect. The reason that can be advanced from this scenario is that when a 
country trades more, they have more to offer in terms of export in the world market and 
the relative cautious actions taken to engage in protection. The series of trade litigation 
involving US, Russia, China, India and Mexico among others are handy testimonies in 
this regard (ICTSD, 2012 a-e). Some of these actions could be retaliatory or otherwise 
(Baldwin and Evenett, 2009; Datt et al, 2011; Boffa and Olarreaga, 2012). The reason 
advanced for this may be because of the submissions of Stiglitz (2002), Winters and 
Mackay (2004) and Bhagwati (2009), that trade liberalization may have a 
counterproductive effect on the economy of a country. So in order to avoid this, a 
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country that is better integrated with the world market may likely engage in protective 
acts to regulate their vulnerability. 	  
Another variable is that the dummy for WTO founding members had a positive sign and 
was significant in both tables. The implication of this is that founding members of WTO 
will tend to protect more than others, which may be interpreted based on the fact that 
founding members may tend to have domineering influence vis-a-vis likelihood to 
protect. Extant occurrences since the global financial crises support this assertion. 	  
Implications of Protectionist Actions	  
The results of the estimation were presented in Table 7.4 for the sampled countries and 
African countries sub-sample. The examinations of the reliability of the estimations using 
the probability value of the F-statistics, which was significant at 1% shows that the 
results are of good fit and represent the best linear unbiased estimates. 	  
Focusing on the explanatory variable of interest, Table 7.4 reveals that the extent of 
protective measures implemented by countries (Prop_red) had negative and significant 
impact on per capita income both for the entire sample and only African countries.  The 
negative impact on per capita income might have resulted from the protective measures 
engaged by countries that impact on economies probably through lowered level of 
capital formation occasioned by global financial crises. This becomes more evident 
when one considers another explanatory variable, growth rate of capital formation that 
had a surprising negative sign for the period (2009-2010). This might have resulted from 
the issue of ‘capital flight’ and ‘crash’ in the stock market as most economic activities 
became ‘gloomy’ over the period. The above tends to aggress with Feenstra (1992) who 
noted for the US economy that domestic producers benefit from protectionism but 
consumers suffer increased prices as protectionism denotes less international 
competition. 	  
The impact of protective actions on trade balance had negative sign denoting the 
adverse influence of protectionism on trade balance. It was not significant for the entire 
sample but for the African countries, it was significant at 5%. This finding is of interest as 
it has some implication for policy. In essence, the contemporary protectionism adversely 
affects African countries’ trade outcome as protectionism inhibits their trade (especially 
export) flows.  This typifies the structural ineptitude of most African economies given that 
their export baskets are characterised by unprocessed raw materials and commodities, 
which suffered a great deal with regards to price crash after 2007/08 global economic 
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crises. Thus, African economies are more vulnerable to adverse external trade policies. 
This is imperative as there was significant burst in commodities prices that resulted from 
decreased global demand. Akin to the above are the issues of low supply chain and 
value addition on unprocessed raw materials and commodities in the world market. Also 
the fact that most African countries import finished products indicating their increased 
import bills accompanied by reduced export for their goods re-echoes the negative 
impact on the trade balance. 	  
	  
The policy recommendation from the study is that it is imperative for African countries to 
diversify their export base in order to mitigate the adverse effect of global protectionism. 
This will involve processing raw materials, boosting domestic efficiency by promoting 
infrastructural provisions, improving transport system among others. Thus, reducing 
export constraints as most African countries do not have the wherewithal (such like 
technical, financial) to contend with the developed countries regarding their protective 
actions. This is exemplified as it is not common (apart from South Africa) to see African 
countries initiate trade dispute against a developed countries that contravenes the WTO 
rules. Thus, improving domestic effectiveness of African economies is a better policy 
option than crying foul at protective actions. The role of Africa’s RTAs in this regard 
cannot be overemphasised. This concurs with Osabuohien and Efobi (2011) submission 
that aiding improved institution qualities by Africa’s RTA is germane for improving the 
continent’s trade outcome. 	  
	  
Table 7.4: Impact of Protectionism on Per capita income and Trade Balance	  
	   All 	   African 
countries	  
 Dependent 
variable	  
Per capita Income 	   Trade Balance 	   P
e
r 
c
a
p
it
a 
I
n
c
o
m
e 	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e 
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nce	  
Cap	   -1.2469a	   0.0555 a	   -
0
.
8
9
0.072
5 a	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3
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8
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Note: Probability values are in parenthesis. Superscripts a,b and c represent significant at 1, 5 
and 10%.	  
Source: Authors’ computation.	  
	  
Other results in Table 7.4 reveal that price changes (inflation) had significant and inverse 
relationship with per capita income. This follows economic theory that price changes in 
the basket of goods purchased by the consumer will exert pressure on their level of 
income. Labour variable had a positive impact on per capita income but a negative 
impact on trade. Exchange rate had positive and significant impact on trade balance. 
The positive impact shows that exchange rate appreciation would enhance export value 
because producers would benefit from the appreciated exchange rate. This might also 
be interpreted to mean that exchange depreciation will not be an effective trade policy 
instrument during economic crises. However, given the fact that trade balance was 
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considered, the effect might have also resulted from increased prices of imported goods 
when there is depreciation. 	  
8. Summary of Major Findings and Concluding Remarks	  
One of the core preoccupations towards cooperation by countries is to boost mutual 
benefits among members especially with respect to trade as encapsulated in WTO and 
various RTAs protocols. This is particularly evidenced as the cumulative RTAs across 
the world between 1990s and 2011 have tripled. However, despite this ‘gospel’ of free 
trade, the GTA reports varieties of protective measures that have been initiated by many 
countries that are signatories to the WTO as well as a number RTAs; this became more 
pronounced after the 2008 global financial crises. This sort of contradiction forms one of 
the motivations for this study which examines the tendency of countries’ gliding towards 
free protectionism and how countries’ institutional quality, level of infrastructure and 
economic development can influence their relativity towards protectionism.	  
	  
To achieve the objectives, the study engaged three main forms of analysis. These 
include content analysis of the GTA’s protective measures, statistical investigation and 
econometric analysis. The econometric analysis formulates an empirical model that 
relates countries’ tendencies to protect as a function of some explanatory variables such 
as quality of institutions, infrastructure, level of economic development, trade integration, 
among others.  From the analyses, the main findings of the study are summarised as 
herein.	  
	  
For the first quarter of 2012, the number of protective measures put in place was about 
67, which involved mainly bail out and trade defence instruments that account for more 
than 74% of the total measures. Between early 2009 and late 2011, the trade defence 
instruments of protection and bailout represented about 25% of the total measures, while 
other commonly used protective measures included: tariff and non-tariff that amounted 
up to 14.23% and 13.88% of the total measures, respectively. 	  
	  
The econometric result at first seems to suggest that (using life expectancy and 
economic growth rate as indicators of economic development), as a country develops 
the less likely its tendency to engage in trade protection. However, this allusion was not 
substantiated by the fact that these variables were not statistically significant in most of 
the regressions. The concluding remark emanating from this finding is that a country’s 
economic development does significantly influence its likelihood for trade protection. 
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This submission is further confirmed as developing country dummy in all the regressions 
had a positive sign but was not statistically significant. Therefore, it could be concluded 
that a country’s level of economic development is not an influencing factor with regards 
to its tendency to engage in trade protectionism.	  
	  
More importantly, the study found that the respective indicators of institutional quality 
had negative signs that are statistically significant. The implication of this finding is that 
as a country’s institutional quality improves; the less likely it is to engage in 
protectionism. This may be justified by the fact that a country’s domestic institutions such 
as the quality of regulation, rule of law, and effectiveness of the government will be able 
to guide and guard the economic activities of the country, which will imply less reliance 
of external mechanism. This is evidenced from phenomenon where countries that are 
known to have internal security challenges usually have stringent policies: immigration 
policies, for instance.	  
	  
On the other hand, the results from the study tend to suggest that the level of 
infrastructural development in the country with regards to the logistic performance has 
some influence on the tendency of a country to protect. This means that as a country’s 
logistics performance improves, the higher the likelihood of the country to engage in 
trade protection. Furthermore, it was observed that trade integration was positive and 
statistically significant suggesting that the more a country engages in trade, the more the 
tendency to protect. This may be due to the fact that when a country trades more (both 
export and import), it tends to have more stakes in the world market and as result it will 
be more vigilant with respect to guiding against possible trade losses, while at the same 
time maximising trade benefits. This is not too far-fetched as countries known to be 
major players in the global trading arena are also regular complainants of trade cases. 
The issue of retaliation could also be another plausible reason. 	  
	  
Examining WTO founding member dummy, it was revealed that the variable had a 
positive significant influence on the tendency to engage in protectionism. This seems to 
imply that the founding members of WTO will tend to be more protective than others, 
which may stem from the fact that founding members are more likely to have 
domineering influence than others.	  
 	  
On the other hand, it was found that protective actions had negative impact on trade 
balance, which was only significant for the African countries. Thus, the recent trade 
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protectionism impacts adversely on the trade outcome of African countries as most of 
them export mainly unprocessed raw materials.  This suggests the need for African 
countries to diversify their export capacities by putting in place mechanisms that will 
facilitate the processing of raw materials and enhancing trade infrastructure. 	  
	  
The study observes that inasmuch as there are differences between countries’ national 
interest and the contents of international trade protocols, there will always be an 
inclination of countries to engage in some form of protective measures as countries seek 
to protect the interest of their citizenry. Thus, the less synchronised countries’ national 
interests are to international protocols, the more the tendency to protect, which will make 
the free trade-protectionism debate unending. The influence of countries’ institutional 
quality is pivotal in this process. The study concludes that the debate surrounding free 
trade-protectionism will persist with some grave implications especially in Africa.	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Appendix: List of Sampled Countries 	  
They include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia, Botswana ,Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Korea, Kuwait, and Kyrgyz Republic. Other are: Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxemburg, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand,  Nigeria, Northern Island, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippine, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan (before the 
creation South Sudan), Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Arab Emirate, Uganda, United Kingdom,  Ukraine, 
United States of America, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe	  
	  

